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Abstract
Unlike previous analyses, we consider (i) that IT may a¤ect productivity
growth both directly and indirectly, through human capital interactions, and
(ii) possible externalities in the use of IT. Examining, hypothetically, the sta-
tistical consequences of erroneously disregarding (i) and (ii) we shed light on the
small or negative growth e¤ects found in early U.S. studies, as well as the posi-
tive impacts reported recently. Our empirical analysis uses a 14-industry panel
for Swedish manufacturing 1986-95. We …nd that human capital develop-ments
made the average e¤ect of IT essentially zero in 1986 and steadily increasing
thereafter, and, also, generated large di¤erences in growth e¤ects across indus-
tries.
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01 Introduction
The IT productivity paradox was formulated by the Nobel laureate Robert Solow in
response to the fact that the massive investments in information technology (IT) that
started around 1980 did not seem to have any positive e¤ects on productivity growth:
”You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” [Solow
(1987)]
In recent years, the original focus on computers has been broadened to include also
communication devices: the concept of IT has been extended to ICT, information and
communication technology. In this paper, we have accounted for the development of
communications equipment. We have kept the term IT, however, mainly for historical
reasons but also because we …nd the term ICT somewhat arti…cial. After all, what is
the use of information if it isn’t communicated?
In empirical studies, the paradox has received support in analyses based on early
(pre–1990) data for the U.S. or Canada. Mostly, the results show either very small
or insigni…cant e¤ects of IT on productivity growth; see, e.g., Harris and Katz (1991)
and Parsons, Gotlieb, and Denny (1993). Even more disturbing, some studies have
reported signi…cantly negative e¤ects; cf. Loveman (1988) and Berndt and Morri-
son (1995). A number of explanations to these counter-intuitive results have been
suggested. Some of the most common ones are: the time required before the IT
investments manifest themselves in increased productivity has been underestimated,
the magnitude of the investments have been overestimated, measurement problems
on both the input side and the output side have concealed the productivity e¤ects.1
However, a couple of recent studies, using data extending to the end of the 1990’s,
have found productivity–increasing e¤ects of IT. Oliner and Sichel (2000) argue that
the reason why there were no e¤ects earlier is that, in the U.S., IT investments did
not really take o¤ until 1995. When they did the e¤ects were substantial, however:
1These and other explanations will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.
1Oliner and Sichel claim that IT accounted for about two–thirds of the acceleration in
labor productivity between the …rst and second halves of the 1990’s.
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1999) take a di¤erent approach to resolving the
paradox. Taking up the idea of capital-skill complementarity discussed by Griliches
(1969) and Lucas (1990), they argue that too much attention has been paid to invest-
ments in hardware and software and too little attention has been paid to the human
capital structure in the …rms investing in IT. Accounting for both IT and human
capital, they …nd that the balance between the two is crucial. Firms with high levels
of both IT and human capital are found to be the most productive. Furthermore:
…rms with low levels of both IT and human capital are shown to be more productive
than …rms that are high on IT and low on human capital, or vice versa.
The framework we suggest in this paper is similar to the Bresnahan et al. (op.cit.)
approach in the sense that we, too, conjecture that human capital is a key element in
the explanation of the IT productivity paradox. However, we go further in exploiting
the human capital connection. We make use of the endogenous growth model dis-
cussed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999), where an externality is created through
a combination of learning–by–investing and knowledge spillovers. Moreover, endoge-
nous growth theory also provides us with an important insight with respect to the
form of the relationship between human capital and productivity growth. As shown
by Romer (1990) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) this theory implies that the levels
of human capital and physical capital like, e.g., computers should be important in
explaining the rate of productivity growth.
The empirical analysis is based on data for 14 industries in the Swedish manufac-
turing sector, observed annually 1986–1995. It appears that in the Swedish manu-
facturing sector the productivity-enhancing e¤ects of IT started to show already in
the …rst half of the 1990s, i.e. some …ve years earlier than in the U.S. Otherwise,
the developments in the two countries seems to have been qualitatively similar. The
2present analysis should be of relevance for the U.S., too.
The next section contains a review of some attempts to explain the IT productivity
paradox. In Section 3 we try to reconcile the di¤erent explanations by means of
a stylized model. Section 4 describes the data that we have used in the empirical
analysis. Our results are provided in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6.
2 Literature review: attempts to explain the paradox
For brevity, we will here only provide a very condensed list of some explanations to
the IT productivity paradox that have been suggested in the literature.2
² Investments in IT have really been massive only very recently. Thus, early
analyses were unable to capture positive growth e¤ects from IT simply because,
at the time, these investments were still comparatively small. Studies using later
data should be able to discern positive growth e¤ects. This view is supported
by the recent study by Oliner and Sichel (2000).
It should be noted, however, that this explanation has nothing to say about the
signi…cantly negative e¤ects established by, e.g., Loveman (1988) and Berndt
and Morrison (1995)
² It takes time before the productivity-enhancing e¤ects of a new technology can be
realized. This point has perhaps been most convincingly made by David (1990).
From an empirical point of view, this explanation is similar to the previous
one. An important di¤erence, however, is that this explanation can account for
(initial) negative e¤ects of IT on productivity, provided that the di¤usion of IT
use is associated with learning costs that decrease over time, as a function of
the increasing number of users.
2For a more extensive discussion see, e.g., Triplett (1999). Also, see Gordon (2000), for the view
that there is essentially no paradox to explain, because the importance of the introduction of IT has
been vastly exaggerated, compared to the signi…cance of other technological developments like the
adoption of electricity.
3This explanation also points to the importance of (positive) externalities. As
the knowledge about (how to exploit) IT becomes more wide-spread, this will
speed up the rate of di¤usion. The resulting increase in the number of people
with access to IT will raise the bene…ts of IT accruing to individual users, which
will accelerate di¤usion even more. The importance of this spiralling e¤ect has
been especially notable in the 1990’s, with the rapidly expanding use of email
and the Internet.
² Mismeasurement of outputs. According to this explanation, the use of IT has
increased the quality of existing products and services and created lots of new
goods, neither of which are (fully) captured in the o¢cial statistics. This has led
to a downward bias in the measured output growth e¤ects; see, e.g., Brynjolfsson
(1993). Still, it is essential to point out, like Lee and Barua (1999) do, that
e¢ciency related gains in the production of the ”old” goods should still be
accounted for by conventional output measures. Thus, while mismeasurement
of output certainly is part of the puzzle it cannot resolve it entirely.
A second problem, discussed by Siegel (1997), is that economic ‡uctuations can
introduce a wedge between ”true” and reported output prices, thereby creating a
bias in measured output volume. This problem can be overcome by conditioning
productivity growth upon a business cycle indicator.
² Mismeasurement of inputs. On the input side the issue of mismeasurement is
less clear-cut than on the output side. On the one hand, it can be argued that
early (U.S.) measures of IT were overstated as they included equipment not
ordinarily associated with IT like, e.g., typewriters and accounting machinery.3
On the other hand, the often noted di¢culties to adjust for quality increases
3These were included in Bureau of Economic Analysis category ”O¢ce Computing and Accoun-
ting Machinery; cf Berndt and Morrison (1995). After 1982 this category was replaced by ”Informa-
tion Processing and Related Equipment”, see Lee and Barua (1999).
4in IT price indexes implies a tendency to underestimate the volumes of IT
investments.4 And the presence of positive externalities in the use of IT, cf. the
second point above, points in the same direction. Failure to account for these
externalities will, again, bias measures of IT inputs downwards.
² Overinvestments in IT, in the latter half of the 1980s. This explanation has
been suggested by Morrison (1997), based on the …nding that in U.S. man-
ufacturing industries estimated bene…t–cost ratios (Tobin’s q) for IT capital
dropped signi…cantly below 1 by the mid 1980s. It is natural to interpret the
term ”overinvestment” in a relative sense here, i.e. that IT investments were
too large compared to outlays on other factors of production, notably human
capital.
² Lack of organizational changes accompanying the IT investments. Brynjolfs-
son and Hitt (2000) argue that in order to exploit the full potential of IT the
technology has to be combined with changes in work practices such as, decen-
tralization and decreased vertical integration. They point out, however, that
often such changes can only be captured by …rm-level case studies.
² No account has been taken of the complementarity between IT and skilled work-
ers. Although the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis was put forward
already by Griliches (1969), the connection between IT and human capital has
almost invariably been disregarded in assessments of the possible productivity-
enhancing e¤ects of IT.5 Presumably, this is primarily due to lack of data.
4Much of the estimation of IT price indexes has focussed on price indexes for computers. For a
hedonic approach to this problem, see Berndt, Griliches and Rappaport (1995).
Observing that IT involves non-computer equipment, too, Lee and Barua (1999) have turned
upside down the argument about how the quality adjustment problem a¤ects the measured volumes
of IT. In their examination of the study by Loveman (1988), they argue that by applying a computer
price index to all types of IT Loveman overestimated the volumes of IT investments. While valid
with respect to the early de…nitions of IT that involved many items whose IT character could be
questioned and which, accordingly, did not undergo equally rapid quality increases as computers,
this criticism is probably much less valid today.
5However, complementarity between IT and skilled workers has been documented in studies of
5However, by matching two di¤erent data sets Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt
(1999) have overcome this problem. Splitting their data into four categories
according to whether …rms are ”high” or ”low” on IT and human capital, they
…nd high levels of productivity in …rms that are either high on both IT and
human capital or low in both of these dimensions. Relatively lower levels of
productivity are found in …rms that are high in one of the two dimensions and
low in the other.6
From this brief review it is clear that there are rather diverse results on the connection
between IT and growth, and that the explanations for these …ndings are rather diverse,
too. Our next step is to formulate a simple model that can reconcile the di¤erent
results and discriminate between some of the suggested explanations.
3 A stylized model
In order to highlight some of the features of previous analyses that we believe are of
special importance, we consider a stylized version of the model that we use in our
empirical analysis. One purpose with this section is to show that it is possible within
a simple framework to account for the fact that the e¤ects of IT on growth seem
to have changed over time. Another, is to show that such a framework allows an
assessment of the relative merits of some of the explanations suggested in Section 2.
Our stylized model captures three features:
1. The connection between IT and human capital; a link that has been largely
ignored in most previous studies. By treating human capital as an omitted
variable in the earlier studies, we can easily relate them to our analysis.
2. Measurement error in the IT variable(s).
labor demand, see, e.g. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Autor, Katz and Kreuger (1998).
6A related approach is taken by Siegel (1997), who considers the possibility that the investments
in IT may induce enhanced quality (e¢ciency) of labor which, in turn, positively a¤ects total factor
productivity growth. He …nds some, although not unambiguous, support for this hypothesis.
63. Positive externalities in the use of IT, arising through learning–by–investing and
knowledge spillovers [Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1999, Ch. 4)].
One issue that is not included in this list is the problem of output measurement
error. From an analytical point of view, output measurement error is much less
problematic than input measurement error. While the latter can be both negative
and positive, the error in measured output can safely be assumed to imply that output
is underestimated. Since IT should also have positive e¤ect on output as recorded by
conventional output measures [Lee and Barua (1999)], abstracting from output error
should primarily a¤ect the level of growth. The qualitative nature of the relation
between IT and growth should not be much a¤ected.
The second source of output measurement error considered in Section 2, economic
‡uctuations, will be taken care of in the econometric analysis. However, as the corre-
sponding adjustment merely amounts to adding a control variable to the productivity
growth equation it does not add anything to the discussion here.
Our simple model will be based on the maintained hypothesis that information
technology and human capital are complements. As noted above, this notion has
received empirical support in the study of Bresnahan et al. (1999).
Denote by gt the rate of growth in total factor productivity in a given industry in
period t and denote by IT and HC measures of information technology and human
capital, respectively. We assume that the ”true” model is
gt = ¯o + ¯1tITt¡1 + ¯2(IT £ HC)t¡1 + ut where ¯2 > 0: (1)
The interpretation of the coe¢cient ¯1t depends on the speci…cation of the IT variable.
In a traditional growth accounting context IT would measure the growth rate in
information technology. In that case ¯1t would be interpreted as a measure of the
”excess return” to IT; see, e.g., Siegel (1997). The reason is that investments in IT,
weighted by ex ante rental prices, are already included in the rate of productivity
7growth, gt.
Here, we rather think of IT as a measure of the level of IT capital which, together
with the level of human capital, HC, determines the rate of productivity growth, as
suggested by Romer (1990). However, with respect to the theoretical results below,
this distinction is immaterial. Those results only concern the sign of ¯1t which under
both speci…cations should be positive if IT enhances productivity growth.
The maintained hypothesis is manifested in the positivity constraint on the coef-
…cient for the interaction variable, (IT £ HC). As noted in point 1, this kind of
variable has mostly been omitted in earlier analyses.
The IT and IT £ HC variables are lagged one period. There are two reasons
for this. First, IT and human capital are not likely to a¤ect productivity growth
momentarily, but with some delay. Secondly, by considering the previous period’s IT
and HC we do not have to account for the fact that the choice of inputs as well as
the choice of output is really endogenous; lagging IT and HC we can treat them as
predetermined variables.
The e¤ect of the interaction term IT £ HC is to make the in‡uence of IT on
productivity growth conditional on the sector’s human capital:
@gt
@ITt¡1
= ¯1t + ¯2HCt¡1. (2)
Thus, the e¤ect of IT on productivity growth is increasing in human capital. Note,
however, that the total e¤ect on growth need not be positive, provided that ¯1t is
negative and su¢ciently large in magnitude.
For simplicity, the disturbances, the ut, will here be assumed to be independently
and identically distributed. In Section 5, we will take into consideration that the
disturbances are likely to be di¤erently distributed across industries.
To account for measurement error in the IT variable, we assume that observed IT,
IT ¤, is given by:
8IT
¤
t = ITt + wt (3)
where w represents pure measurement error that is uncorrelated with IT i.e. E (w) =
0, V ar(w) = ¾2
w, and Cov (IT;w) = 0. Moreover, we take w to be uncorrelated with
HC and u, as well and, …nally, u and w to be uncorrelated. We thus have:
Cov (w;IT) = Cov (w;IT £ HC) = Cov(u;w) = 0: (4)
Next, note that there is a subindex t on the parameter ¯1. This indicates that
this is a time-varying parameter. The reason for this assumption is that we want to
capture the externality in the use of IT; cf. point 3 above.7 We thus specify ¯1t as a














0 > 0 (5)
where PRODN
IT; IMP N
IT , and EXPN
IT denote production, imports, and exports of
IT at the national level, respectively.8 This speci…cation is motivated by the fact
that, by de…nition, an externality is an e¤ect which is not accounted for by individual
…rms. Accordingly, it will not be re‡ected in the capital rental prices involved in the
computation of the rate of productivity growth, gt.9 As Ã is an increasing function,
an increase in the externality will lead to a larger e¤ect on growth.
Referring to the model discussed by Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1999), it is natural
to relate the speci…cation (5) to the learning–by–investing mechanism. The other
element of their model, knowledge spillovers, we can connect with the variable IT £
HC and the corresponding coe¢cient ¯2. Here, the natural association is networks:
7Siegel (1997) also tries to capture IT externalities, albeit in a more narrow sense, by means of
a measure of the IT investments made by the industry’s suppliers.
8The argument of the function Ã is introduced in lagged form, for the same reason that the va-
riables IT and HC are entered lagged one period, cf. above.
9This, in turn, means that the rate of IT investment will be less than the socially optimal rate.
As shown by Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1999, pp. 150–151) the social optimum can be obtained by
the introduction of an investment tax credit. The income tax reduction in connection with the pur-
chase of personal computers for private use that has been available in Sweden since 1998 can be seen
as an investment tax credit of this kind.
9employees working with computers tend to form networks with colleagues in other
…rms and organizations, networks which facilitate the transfer of knowledge in general
and, in particular, information on how to exploit IT (more) e¢ciently.10 Thus, while
the primary function of the variable IT £ HC is to account for complementarity
between IT and human capital, the HC factor may also pick up an externality due
to knowledge spillovers. We will not be able to distinguish the two empirically; both
the complementarity e¤ect and the externality should result in positive estimates of
¯2.
Using the model described by equations (1) – (5), we will discuss three important
issues that have arisen in connection with earlier studies, namely:
I. Can the negative e¤ects of IT on productivity growth that have been found in
several studies based on (U.S.) pre–1990 data be explained by measurement
error in the IT variable, as argued by Lee and Barua (1999), or are they more
likely to be indicative of a truly negative return to early IT investments, as
argued by Morrison (1997)?
II. Why is it that models similar to the one just outlined yield positive returns when
applied to later data? Can this …nding simply be explained by a late surge in
IT investments, as argued by Oliner and Sichel (2000)?
III. If complementarity between IT and skilled labor is allowed for, like in Bresnahan
et al. (1999), in order to trace indirect e¤ects of IT that a¤ect growth through
human capital, what should one then expect will happen with the estimated
direct e¤ect?
To be able to discuss these points we need some preliminary results. To this end,
assume that gt is regressed on the observed IT variable, i.e. IT¤
t¡1, using data for
10The literature on network economics is vast and rapidly growing. Possibly as a result of the
mechanism that we are considering here, an updated bibliography can be found on the Internet at
http://raven.stern.nyu.edu/networks/biblio_hframe.html
10the pre–1990 period and post–1990 period, respectively. This implies that the mea-
surement error in IT is ignored, that the variable (IT £ HC)t¡1 is omitted, and that
no account is taken of the fact that ¯1t is a time–varying coe¢cient. For illustrative
purposes we will here assume that the function Ã is a step function, taking on the
value ¯1;I during the pre-1990 period and the value ¯1;II for the post-1990 period.
To derive the probability limits of the OLS estimates under the stated conditions,






= ¯1;K ¡ ¯1;K ¢ ¸ + ¯2b µ(1 ¡ ¸), K = I, II (6)





and b µ is the coe¢cient from a hypothetical regression of IT £ HC on IT :
b µ =
Cov (IT £ HC;IT)
V ar(IT)
; b µ > 0. (8)
From (6) it can be seen that the bias in the estimate of ¯1;K has two components.
The …rst, ¡¯1;K ¢¸, is the measurement error bias (MEB). The second, caused by the
leaving out of the variable IT £ HC, is the omitted variable bias (OVB). While the
OVB is invariably positive, given the assumptions ¯2 > 0 and b µ > 0, the sign of the
MEB is determined by the sign of the true parameter ¯1;K . If ¯1;K is positive then
the MEB will be negative, and if ¯1;K is negative, the MEB will be positive.
Equation (6) can be used to derive upper and lower bounds on the probability limit
of the OLS estimate b ¯1;K. These bounds are given in Table 1, for various assumptions
about the true parameter and the magnitude of the omitted variable bias.
11Lam and Schoeni consider how the estimated e¤ect on earnings from another year of schooling
is a¤ected when data on ”ability” are lacking and there is measurement error in the schooling varia-
ble.
11Table 1: Ranges for the probability limit of the OLS estimate of ¯1;K, for di¤erent
signs of the true e¤ect and di¤erent magnitudes of the omitted variable
bias























Note: The index K denotes either I or II
We can now consider issue I. As can be seen in Table 1, there is only one case in




belongs to <¡, namely case iii). This case corresponds





; this is so because the omitted variable bias, ¯2b µ, is positive. There are
thus good reasons to believe that a negative estimate corresponds to a truly negative
e¤ect. Furthermore, this conclusion is not changed if it is assumed that there is no





upper bound of the range but as this upper bound is equal to zero, the probability
limit does not change sign even if the measurement error is eliminated altogether.
We may thus conclude that while the presence of measurement error can a¤ect the
magnitude of the estimated e¤ect it is very unlikely that it can explain its direction.
Accordingly, from our viewpoint, Morrison’s (1997) suggestion that overinvestment
in IT during the latter part of the 1980’s caused a negative e¤ect on productivity
growth seems more plausible than the claim made by Lee and Barua (1999) that the
negative relation was due to measurement error.12
12Actually, Lee and Barua do not report any results showing the e¤ects of measurement error
only. They state that ”.... the negative contribution of IT .... is attributable primarily to the choices
of the IT de‡ator and modeling technique.” However, they do not provide any assessment making
it possible to disentangle the impacts of these two factors.
12We next consider point II. While the …ndings by Oliner and Sichel (2000) do not
provide an answer, simply because they do not attempt to explain the change in TFP
growth, their results indicate what kind of explanation we should be looking for.
Heavy investments in IT and falling prices of computers mean that IT is becoming
available to an ever increasing number of people. This development will increase the
positive externalities associated with the use of IT.
To formalize this point, we assume that ¯1;II > ¯1;I , in accordance with (5). How-
ever, this assumption is not su¢cient to determine the sign of ¯1;II. Above, we
concluded that it is most likely that ¯1;I < 0. Accordingly, ¯1;II may be negative, too,
albeit closer to zero than ¯1;I. Unfortunately, the sign of the estimate b ¯1;II is not of





with both ¯1;II > 0 and ¯1;II < 0; cf cases i) and ii), respectively. However, going a
step further enables us to discriminate between these two cases.
The additional step involves expanding the simple OLS regression by including a
vector of proxy variables for the omitted variable, i.e. for IT £ HC. The point is
that this will a¤ect the estimate of ¯1;II di¤erently, depending on the sign of the true
parameter ¯1;II. To demonstrate this, we provide the probability limit of the estimate
of ¯1;K when proxy variables are included in the regression. We then compare this
equation with equation (6) under di¤erent assumptions about the sign of ¯1;K.
Denote the vector of proxy variables by P, and the corresponding estimate of ¯1;K









+ ¯2b µ(1 ¡ ¸) ¢ Á(IT¤;IT ¤ £ HC;P)
(9)
where R2
IT¤£HC;P denotes the R2 obtained when IT¤ £ HC is regressed on P, and
Á(¢) is a function that under fairly general conditions satis…es 0 < Á(¢) < 1.13
13Like (6), this equation draws on Lam and Schoeni (1993). They provide a similar expression to
13Comparing (6) and (9) we note that









The implication (10) is due to the fact that the inclusion of proxy variables a¤ects
the measurement error bias (MEB) and the omitted variable bias (OVB) in the same






]0;1[ implies that including proxies makes the MEB larger in magnitude, i.e. smaller
because of the minus sign. The OVB, while positive, becomes smaller, too, because
0 < Á(¢) < 1.
If, on the other hand, ¯1;K < 0 then the e¤ect of including proxy variables is
ambiguous:









The ambiguity is due to the fact that in this case the MEB and the OVB change
in di¤erent directions. The MEB, which is positive in this case, increases, while the
OVB, which is also positive, decreases.
Thus, by studying the e¤ects of including proxy variables we should be able to
gain additional information about the sign of the true parameter ¯1;II . First, if the
inclusion of proxies increases the estimate ¯1;II then, by (10), this is a strong indication
that ¯1;II is not positive. On the other hand, if by adding proxies we decrease the
estimate of ¯1;II then our results are consistent with ¯1;II being positive. To sum up:
if ¯1;II is indeed positive, then the estimate of ¯1;II should be positive when human
capital variables are excluded from the regression and this positive estimate should
decrease towards zero when proxy variables for human capital are included.
The last paragraph also provides the answer to issue III. It shows that the answer
depends on the sign of the true direct e¤ect. If the true direct e¤ect is negative, then
assess the e¤ect on the estimated return to schooling when a proxy variable for the missing ability
measure is included in the regression.
14allowing for indirect e¤ects through complementarity between IT and human capital
will increase the estimated direct e¤ect. If, on the other hand, the true direct e¤ect
is positive then allowing for indirect e¤ects will decrease the estimated direct e¤ect.
4 Data, variable de…nitions, and measurement issues
Our empirical analysis covers 14 industries in the Swedish manufacturing sector, ob-
served annually over the period 1986–1995. Table 2 gives the industry codes. To
indicate the relative size of the industries we also show their shares in manufac-
turing employment in the midpoint of the observation period. The data used are
all part of the o¢cial statistics produced by Statistics Sweden and come from: the
Swedish National Accounts (NA), the Employment Register (ER), the Labor Force
Surveys (LFS), various Investment Surveys (IS) and the Trade Statistics (TS).The
cross-sectional dimension of the data is a result of the most detailed break–down of
IT investments provided in the IS. In the time series dimension, the starting point is
given by the …rst year of the ER. The end point is the result of a change in the




















Food, Beverages and Tobacco
Textile, Apparel & Leather
Saw Mills and Wood Products
Pulp, Paper and Printing & Publishing




Machinery & Equipment, not elsewhere classi…ed
Electrical Machinery, not elswhere classi…ed
Transport Equipment, except Shipyards



















Note: The classi…carion system used here is very close to the ISIC codes.
15industrial classi…cation system, making it impossible to extend the time series beyond
1995.
4.1 The growth rate in total factor productivity
The variable whose variation we seek to explain is annual changes in rate of growth in
total factor productivity (TFP). The TFP growth rate has been computed by means
of a Törnqvist index.
Denoting the volume of gross output by Y and the volume of input i by Xi, the
TFP growth rate g, is de…ned according to
gt ´ ¢lnTFPt = ¢lnYt ¡ ¢lnXt t = 1986;::::;1995 (12)
where ¢ is the di¤erence operator, de…ned such that ¢ lnZt ´ lnZt ¡ lnZt¡1. To
avoid excessive notation when we consider aggregate input in more detail, we suppress
industry indexes here.
The growth in aggregate input is computed as a weighted average of the growth

















where Pi is price of input i.
The eight inputs considered are
KC = Stock of computer equipment capital,
KM = Stock of non-computer equipment capital,
KS = Stock of structure capital,
16L1 = # of full-time employees with elementary school (less than 9 years),
L2 = # of full-time employees with 9 year compulsory school,
L3 = # of full-time employees with upper secondary school,
L4 = # of full-time employees with tertiary and postgraduate education,
IG = Intermediate goods.
These variables will be described below.
Figure 1: Weighted averages of TFP growth rates in Swedish manufacturing 1986-
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Figure 2: The industry variation around the weighted average. All observations
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17Figure 1 shows how the industry-weighted average of TFP growth rates has evolved
over time. Each industry is weighted by its employment share, i.e. its share in
L = L1 + L2 + L3 + L4. It can be seen that there is a marked di¤erence between
the latter half of the 1980s and the …rst half of the 1990’s. While the period 1986–
1990 showed low but stable growth, the growth rates during the 1991–1995 period
were much higher, on average, and also more volatile. Figure 2 shows, however, that
the variation around the weighted averages is smaller in the 1991–1995 period than
during 1986–1990. It thus seems like the higher average growth rates in the …rst half
of the 1990s correspond to a general tendency, rather than just being the result of
high growth rates in some large industries.
It can be argued, of course, that the increase in TFP growth in the latter half of the
period is not only due to IT developments, but also to business cycle changes. This
is true – during the years 1992–1994 Sweden went through the deepest trough since
the depression in the 1930s and the restructuring that took place in its wake should
de…nitely account for part of the high productivity growth rates. We will, however,
control for the business cycle; cf. Section 4.5.
4.2 Measures of IT equipment and IT use
Following, e.g., Berndt and Morrison (1995), we use the share of computers in the
total capital stock as our measure of IT equipment. In so doing, we also account for
the point raised by Oliner and Sichel (2000) that the e¤ects of the IT investments are
likely to depend on the fraction that these investments make up of total investments.
To avoid simultaneity bias due to the endogeneity of investments (cf. the discussion
in Section 3) we relate the computer capital stock share in year t¡1 to productivity
growth in year t, i.e. we relate (KC=K)t¡1 to gt, where the subindex C denotes
computers.
A more detailed discussion of what is covered by computer investments and how
18the share of computers in the total capital stock has evolved over time is given in the
next subsection.
The index of the total use of IT, TUIT, discussed in connection with (5), includes
both computers & peripherals, and communication equipment. The data on produc-
tion, imports, and exports are all in …xed (1991) prices and thus measure the volume
development of IT. The time path of the TUIT index is shown in Figure 3.












1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
It can be seen that the use of IT has increased extremely rapidly, especially from 1992
and onwards; between 1992 and 1995 the increase was threefold.
In the regressions we also include TUIT with a one year lag, again to avoid endo-
geneity problems.14
4.3 Capital stocks
The capital stocks have been constructed by means of the national accounts (NA)
and the investment surveys (IS) conducted by Statistics Sweden. The NA provides
capital stocks on equipment and structures, computed according to the Perpetual
Inventory method. By means of data on computer investments from the IS we have
14This means that the dramatic increase in the index between 1994 and 1995 will not a¤ect the
estimated parameters.
19broken down the equipment capital stock into KC, the computer capital stock, and
KM, the stock of non-computer equipment.15
The computer investments cover investments made both for o¢ce use and for use in
the production process, e.g., CNC (computer numerically controlled) equipment and
CAD / CAM – systems. For the manufacturing sector as a whole, the investments
for use in the production process were 3–4 times as large as those for o¢ce use, in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Table 3: Gross investment shares in Swedish manufacturing
































































Table 3 shows that the share of computer investments in total investments increased
dramatically already in the end of the 1980s. In most industries the investment shares
of computers doubled between 1984 and 1989 and in two, 3300 = Saw Mills & Wood
Products and 3700 = Basic Metals, the increase was more than 10-fold.
The relative increase continued into the 1990s. In 1993, ten of the 14 industries
had at least doubled their computer investment shares, compared to 1989. In the
two industries where the increases were the largest, 3830 = Electrical Machinery and
15For details on the computations of the computer capital stocks and the corresponding capital
rental prices (used in the construction of the endogenous variable), see Gunnarsson and Mellander
(1999).
203840 = Transportation, computers accounted for more than 2
3 of total investments in
1993.16
In the accumulation of computer investments into computer capital stocks we have
assumed a constant rate of depreciation of 1
3. The rate of depreciation for computer
capital should exceed that of other types of equipment capital. As the average rates of
depreciation in the NA are between 16 and 21 percent for equipment capital including
computers, 1
3 does not seem like an unreasonable choice. The shares of computers,
non-computer equipment and structures in the total capital stock are given in Table
4.17
Table 4: Capital stock shares in Swedish manufacturing
































































It can be seen that, because of the high rates of depreciation for computers, the
16Berndt and Morrison (1995) [BM] provide a table for a similar break-down of gross investments
in the U.S. manufacturing sector, during the period 1976–86. The shares they report for the end of
that period are mostly considerably higher than the corresponding shares given in Table 2, not only
in 1985 but in 1990 as well. We believe that the high shares in BM are due to a ”too wide” de…ni-
tion of computer equipment; cf. the discussion about mismeasurement of inputs in Section 2. This
conjecture is supported by the claim in Oliner and Sichel (1994) that computers only made up 2
percent of the capital stock in the non-farm business sector as late as 1993. If that claim is correct,
the 26 percent share of computers in total capital that BM report for the manufacturing sector al-
ready in 1986 must be too high.
17The capital stocks for year t are de…ned for January 1 in that year. Accordingly, the years of
investment considered in Table 3 constitute the last additions to the stocks considered in Table 4
below.
21development of the computer capital stock shares is not as spectacular as that of the
investment shares.18 Still, the dramatic increase in investment shares between 1984
and 1989 is matched by an almost equally impressive increase in the computer capital
stock shares between 1985 and 1990. As a consequence of the large build–up of the IT
capital stocks during the end of the 1980s, the increase in the IT investment shares
between 1989 and 1993 had rather modest e¤ects on the development of computer
capital stock shares between 1990 and 1994, however.
It is quite clear from Table 4, there is a lot of variation across industries in our
IT measure, the computer capital stock share. This is important because the rela-
tively short period covered by our data makes cross-sectional variation crucial in our
empirical analysis.
4.4 The human capital data
The human capital variables have been constructed by means of the Swedish Employ-
ment Register (ER) and the Labor Force Surveys (LFS).
The ER contains data on, i.a., the number of employees by industry, their level of
education and …elds-of-study, age, sex, and immigrant status, as well as their yearly
earnings. The LFS provides information on work hours per week, by industry and
sex, enabling an approximate conversion of the number of employees into full-time
equivalents.19
Employment is like investments endogenously determined. Thus, in our regressions,
the human capital variables are also lagged one year, relative to productivity growth.
Table 5 provides cross-classi…cations of labor for the entire manufacturing sector, by
18Comparing, again, with Berndt and Morrison (op.cit., Table 2), we …nd that our computer ca-
pital stock shares di¤er even more from theirs, than did the investment shares. The reason is that
the depreciation rates they used for computer equipment were considerably lower than the rate that
we have used here.
19The approximate nature of the conversion is due to the fact that the LFS does not contain data
on work hours by level of education. As a result, we can only capture that part of the variation in
the work hour distributions across levels of education that stems from di¤erences in gender compo-
sitions.
22level of education and …elds-of-study, for the years 1985, 1990 and 1994. The table
corresponds to weighted averages of the corresponding cross-classi…cations for each
industry, where the weights are given by employment shares.
Table 5: Employment shares in Swedish manufacturing, by level of education and



































































The four cells in the upper left corner of each of the three tables are identically
zero, because the cross-classi…cation by …elds-of-study is possible only for labor with at
least upper secondary school. For the latter, quite detailed …eld-of-study information
23is available, however. The labels ”engineering” and ”business administration” are
used for brevity only; both encompass several sub…elds.
It should be noted that in the empirical analysis we employ cross-classi…cations like
those in Table 5, but which di¤er both with respect to industry and year.
To be able to account for human capital in a broader sense, we will also consider
data on workers’ age. The age structure can matter in two di¤erent ways.
On the hand, an education’s ”IT content” is higher the more recently the education
was obtained, i.e. the younger the worker. This would point to a negative relation
between age and productivity growth.
On the other hand, older workers have accumulated more work experience than
younger workers. Thus, if (speci…c) skills acquired in the workplace are more im-
portant for productivity than (general) computer skills acquired in school, then the
relation between age and productivity growth should be positive instead.
4.5 Control variables
To account for cyclical variations in TFP growth, we have used a business cycle
indicator, BCI, for the Swedish manufacturing sector. It weighs together data on
orders, stocks of …nished goods, and expected production.20 The development of the
BCI over the period studied is shown in Figure 4.
Comparing Figure 4 with Figure 1, we see that the BCI captures the turning
points in TFP growth quite well. However, the BCI cannot explain the relative
magnitudes of productivity growth at di¤erent points in time. In particular, it does
not capture that, on average, TFP growth was much higher during 1991–1995 than
during 1986–1990.
Following, e.g., Berndt and Morrison (1995) we control for changes in capital not
caused by computer investments by means of the share of non-computer equipment in
20The indicator has been constructed by the Swedish Institute for Economic Analysis (Konjunktur-
institutet).
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the total capital stock, KM=K. Since, KC=K +KM=K +KS=K ´ 1, we fully control
for the capital structure by including both KC=K and KM=K in the regressions.
Among the control variables we also include the shares of females and immigrants,
respectively, in the work force.
Gender might be important for two, di¤erent, reasons. First, as pointed out by
Weinberg (2000), computers have created a lot of job openings for women that weren’t
available before, by replacing physically demanding blue-collar jobs by jobs that re-
quire computer knowledge. Second, as discussed by Lindbeck and Snower (2000),
modern work organizations are to an increasing extent characterized by multi-tasking.
To the extent that women are better suited to multi-tasking than men – a hypothesis
for which there is ample anecdotal evidence – this development should favor …rms
with a large female labor share.
Regarding immigrants the direction of causality is more ambiguous. On the one
hand, it could be conjectured that the increased international communication brought
about by IT could be facilitated by a work-force comprising employees with di¤erent
cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, imperfect knowledge of the host country
language might have an adverse e¤ect on productivity.
255 Results
In the …rst part of this section we report results for simplistic growth equations of
the type discussed in the beginning of Section 3, i.e. equations taking no account of
human capital. These regressions will enable us to check the validity of the theoretical
analysis and to make comparisons with results in earlier studies. We will also use one
of these regressions as a benchmark when we assess the empirical importance of our
study. That is to say, we will see what the extended regressions (in Section 5.2) add
in terms of explanatory power and if they relate to the benchmark regressions as
predicted in Section 3.
Before discussing the results we will brie‡y comment upon some features that are
common to all the regressions.
First, in our reported regressions, we follow Romer (1990) in that the rate of pro-
ductivity growth is explained by (ratios of ) level variables. Similar to Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994), initial estimations within the standard growth accounting framework,
using growth rates as explanatory variables, usually yielded insigni…cant results.
Second, the estimations are based on weighted least squares (WLS), where the dif-
ferent industries are weighted by their shares in manufacturing employment. Method-
ologically we thus follow, e.g., Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Kahn and
Lim (1998). The motivation for the WLS procedure can be found in the latter paper:
if we want to know what forces shaped the economy over a historical episode it makes
sense to weigh large industries more heavily, and, more important, it is reasonable to
assume the data for small industries to be noisier than the data for large industries,
which can be taken into account by assuming that the standard errors of the residuals
are inversely proportional to employment.
We model industry-speci…c e¤ects stochastically, by WLS. Alternative estimations
that we have carried out show that this speci…cation …ts the data much better than
deterministic industry–speci…c e¤ects, i.e. industry dummy variables.
26Third, the (contemporaneous) business cycle indicator, BCI, and the (lagged)
share of non-computer equipment capital in the total capital stock, KM=K, are always
included as control variables in the regressions. As noted earlier, the inclusion of the
BCI is a partial correction for output measurement error. The motivation for the
share KM=K is that it has been found to be an important control variable in other
studies, e.g., Berndt and Morrison (1995).
Fourth, throughout the empirical analysis we disregarded possible measurement
error in the IT variable, because we lack information on this issue.
Finally, in the regressions where we account for the externality in the use of IT by
means of the function Ã
h¡
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that was discussed in













= ° ¢ TUITt¡1,
where ° is parameter, assumed positive, and TUIT is the index described in Section
4.2.
5.1 Preliminary regressions, excluding human capital variables
The …rst point made in Section 3 was that the negative e¤ects of IT on productivity
growth reported in some U.S. studies using early (pre–1990) data were not likely to
be mere statistical artifacts. Rather, they are most likely indications of truly negative
e¤ects, possibly arising because of (relative) over-investment in IT.
What, then, can be said of the Swedish manufacturing sector in this respect? To
answer this question, we estimated the following equation for the …rst half of the
period that we study:









¢(KC=K)h;t¡1 R2 = 0:18
(15)
27where absolute values of t–statistics are in parentheses. The e¤ect of IT, i.e. the
coe¢cient of (KC=K)h;t¡1 is negative. The theoretical analysis tells us that, although
the estimate is insigni…cant, this indicates that IT had a negative impact on growth
in Sweden, too, during the latter part of the 1980s.
Estimation of the same equation for the …rst half of the 1990s yields entirely dif-
ferent results:









¢(KC=K)h;t¡1. R2 = 0:48
(16)
However, in accordance with the discussion in Section 3, to be able to draw the
conclusion that the underlying ”true” parameter is indeed positive we have to show
that the estimated e¤ect decreases when a proxy variable for the interaction between
IT and human capital is added to the regression. Using the interaction between KC=K
and the share of labor that has tertiary education within the …eld of engineering,
TE=L; we obtain:












¢(KC=K)h;t¡1 R2 = 0:49
(17)
The inclusion of the IT and human capital interaction variable decreases the estimated
(direct) e¤ect of IT, thus strengthening the conclusion that IT has had a positive e¤ect
on productivity in the 1990s.
While the direct e¤ect decreases markedly, the change in the total e¤ect is much
smaller. The total e¤ect is given by: 0:1385 + 0:2906 ¢ (TE=L). Substituting the
28values in Table 5 for (TE=L), i.e. 0.06, 0.08, and 0.10, we obtain total e¤ects of
0.1559, 0.1617, and 0.1675 in the years 1985, 1990, and 1995, respectively.
Finally, we will estimate the speci…cation (15) for the whole period, although we
already know that the assumption of a constant e¤ect of IT is not supported by the
data. The reason why we, nevertheless, run this regression is that we will use it as a
benchmark against which to evaluate the regressions in the next section.
The outcome of the estimation is quite interesting:









¢(KC=K)h;t¡1. R2 = 0:27:
(18)
The noteworthy result is that the coe¢cient for (KC=K)h;t¡1 is quite close to the
one obtained when the sub-period 1991–95 is considered; cf. (16). This means that
by ignoring the externality we vastly over-estimate the e¤ect of IT on productivity
growth during 1986–90.
A second conclusion is that in a regression ignoring human capital e¤ects a lot of
variation in TFP growth remains to be explained; as can be seen from (18) only 27
percent of the variance in productivity growth is accounted for.
5.2 Incorporating the e¤ects of human capital
Human capital will enter the regressions in two ways: explicitly through interaction
variables involving human capital measures and implicitly through the externality in
IT use. As discussed in Section 3, the latter e¤ect will partly be accounted for by the
index measuring the total use of IT and partly be included in the e¤ects measured
by the human capital interactions.
From an econometric point of view, multicollinearity is an important consideration
in the present context. The more variables involving IT measures that we include in
the regression the more multicollinearity we will get. To obtain precise estimates we
29will try to keep the number of interaction variables down and/or impose constraints
on the coe¢cients.
For the same reason, we will only include human capital variables through the
interaction variables. We will thus disregard direct, or …rst order, e¤ects of human
capital although such e¤ects are suggested by the analyses in Romer (1990) and
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). As an alternative that is less demanding on degrees
of freedom, we will check for the importace of direct e¤ects of human capital by
means of (non-nested) tests investigating whether human capital variables alone can
explain the development of productivity growth rates.Another concern is the speci…c
formulation of the human capital variables.
Concerning the speci…c formulation of the human capital variables, theory does
not provide much guidance. We have, therefore, tried to use speci…cations that are
amenable to policy analysis.
The e¤ect that we are interested in is given the partial derivative of total factor






b µi ¢ Xi (19)
where b µj denotes an estimated coe¢cient and Xj represents an associated variable.

























As the variance computation is a bit complicated we will, to begin with, merely
consider the individual terms in (19), implying that we only have to consider the
corresponding t – ratios.
In Table 6, …ve alternative regressions are reported. In column I, we have included
the direct e¤ect of IT and indirect e¤ects through human capital, which here is
accounted for by educational levels only.
30Table 6: Growth regressions allowing for externalities in the use of IT
and complementarity between IT and human capital.
Dependent variable: ght I II III IV V
Control variables:
Constant -0.0568 -0.0274 -0.0142 -0.0205 -0.0225
(2.709) (1.249) (0.612) (0.803) (1.226)
BCIt 0.0028 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002




h;t¡1 0.1280 0.0737 0.0411 0.0504 0.0547
(3.677) (2.012) (0.993) (1.100) (1.753)






t¡1 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 4.4E-6
(3.614) (0.773) (0.548) (0.034)
Indirect e¤ects of IT through human capital:
h
#Tertiary




































0.3717 0.3760 0.4542 0.9731 .8779
(1.622) (1.862) (2.203) (2.688) (5.289)
h
#9 years












-0.8569 -1.0948 -1.4997 -1.2593
















R2 0.378 0.402 0.414 0.439 0.437
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses
31The direct e¤ect contributes to the partial derivative (19) by the amount 0:0004 ¢
TUITt¡1 and is highly signi…cant. As expected, an increase in the total use of IT
raises the e¤ect of IT on productivity growth.
The …rst of the indirect e¤ects is equal to 0:6201 ¢
# Tertiary
# (Upper sec. + Tertiary). The ratio
measures the share of the number of workers with tertiary education in the number of
workers with at least upper secondary education. Again, the result is in accordance
with prior expectations: an increase in the human capital among the workers with
upper secondary education, through university studies, will enhance the productivity
growth induced by an increase in computers’ share in total capital.
The second indirect e¤ect is de…ned similarly to the …rst. It involves the share of
workers with upper secondary education among workers with either 9 year (compul-
sory) education or upper secondary education. The estimated e¤ect equals 0:3717 ¢
# Upper sec.
# (9 years + Upper sec.) and is almost signi…cant at the 10 percent level.
With respect to the third indirect e¤ect, an unexpected and very signi…cant es-
timate is obtained, namely ¡1:0130 ¢
# 9 years
# (< 9 years + 9 years).. According to this result,
substituting workers with 9 years of education for workers with less than 9 years of
schooling should have a negative e¤ect on the change in productivity growth. This
does not seem plausible. It should be noted, however, that in assessing the e¤ects of
skill upgrading we do not control for di¤erences in age and experience. This turns
out to be important with respect to this particular result.
Since 1962, 9 years of schooling is the minimum level in Sweden. Accordingly,
older individuals predominate among workers with less than 9 years of schooling. For
example, for manufacturing as a whole, almost 60 percent were at least 50 years old
and close to 95 percent were at least 40 years of age.21 This means that a large part of
the variation in the ratio
# 9 years
# (< 9 years + 9 years) is caused by individuals with less than 9
years of schooling going into retirement and being replaced by young individuals that
21Cf. Mellander (1999).
32have just …nished 9 year compulsory school. To a large extent the changes in this ratio
thus re‡ect changes in the age distribution. Such changes might have negative e¤ects,
because employees with long work experience are replaced by individuals without work
experience. On the other hand, the youngsters, while lacking work experience, have
experience from IT during their school years which possibly make them contribute to
productivity growth more than the older workers they replace.
To investigate the relative strengths of these two e¤ects,
# 9 years
# (< 9 years + 9 years) was
regressed on the ratio
# 16 – 29 year olds
# (16 - 29 + 50 - 74 year olds), supposed to roughly re‡ect the re-
placement of workers in the rightmost 15 year age interval in the age distribution
by workers in the corresponding leftmost age interval.22 The result of this regression
was:
# 9 years
# (< 9 years + 9 years) = 0:9989
(26:189)
¢
# 16 – 29 year olds





# Workers , R2 = 0:99
(21)
As the coe¢cient for
# 9 years
# (< 9 years + 9 years) £
KC
K in Table 6, column I, is negative, the
positive coe¢cient for
# 16 – 29 year olds
# (16 - 29 + 50 - 74 year olds) in (21) implies that, with respect to
growth impacts, the negative e¤ect of lost work experience outweighs the addition of
workers with high ”IT content” in their basic education, at least during the period
under study.
In the regression we have also included the share of immigrants among the workers.
The reason is that immigration is the only way in which the numbers of workers with
less than 9 years of schooling can increase. This variable is signi…cantly negative.
Referring, again, to the negative coe¢cient for the ratio
# 9 years
# (< 9 years + 9 years) £
KC
K in
Table 6, column I, this means that the share of immigrants appears to have a positive
22In Sweden the postulated age of retirement in manufacturing is 65. During the period of study,
the average actual age of retirement was between 63 and 64. However, if the employer and the emp-
loyee were in agreement, the employee could continue to work beyond 65. This is the motivation
for including individuals up to 74 years of age.
33e¤ect on the change in the rate of growth. As discussed in Section 4.4, the sign of
the immigrant e¤ect is not clear, a priori. According to this result the positive e¤ect
from in‡uences from other cultures seems to outweigh problems in communication,
due to immigrants having imperfect knowledge of the host country language.
From the R2 in (21) it is obvious that it is impossible to separate the e¤ects of
# 9 years
# (< 9 years + 9 years), on the one hand, and
# 16 – 29 year olds
# (16 - 29 + 50 - 74 year olds) and
# Immigrants
# Workers , on
the other hand. Henceforth, we will, therefore, use the latter two variables instead of
the former. Comparison of columns I and II in Table 6 shows the e¤ect of this change.
The main di¤erence is that the direct e¤ect becomes much smaller and statistically
insigni…cant. This is in line with the discussion in Section 3, predicting that inclusion
of additional human capital variables should decrease the estimated direct e¤ect.
Another noteworthy result is that the contribution of the immigrant share to the
change in productivity growth is not signi…cant. The primary reason for this is that
there is very little variation in the immigrant share, giving rise to multicollinearity
between the immigrant share and the intercept in the growth equation.
Column III di¤ers from column II only in that the share of female workers has been
added. This share is barely signi…cant at the 10 percent level.
However, the gender e¤ect does not seem to be genuine but, rather, a re‡ec-
tion of gender di¤erences with respect to …elds–of -study. This conclusion can be
drawn by comparison of columns III and IV of Table 6. In column IV the variable
# Tertiary
# (Upper sec. + Tertiary) has been disaggregated according to …eld–of–study. This change
makes the female share insigni…cant.
A somewhat counter–intuitive …nding in column IV is the result that increasing
the share of business administrators with tertiary education has a negative impact
e¤ect on the change in productivity growth. However, an explanation for this result
can be found in Murphy et al. (1991). They claim that when talented people become
entrepreneurs they improve the technology and thus a¤ect productivity and income
34growth in a positive way. But talented people can also become rent-seekers in which
case they just redistribute wealth and harm the growth potential of the economy in
the sense that they leave fewer resources for more productive activities.
Murphy et. al. (op. cit) proxy the talent allocated to entrepreneurship and the
talent allocated to rent-seeking by the college enrollment levels in engineering and
law, respectively, and study their implications for growth. They …nd that engineers
and lawyers a¤ect growth directly and indirectly (through correlation with other
variables) in a positive and a negative way, respectively.
Our results in column IV are in line with the indirect e¤ects on growth obtained
by Murphy et al. (op. cit.). As the category business administrator includes lawyers
we can think of the e¤ect of the share of business administrators with tertiary educa-
tion as an indirect measure of the e¤ect of rent-seekers.23 Thus, consistent with the
predictions of Murphy et al we …nd positive e¤ects of engineers (entrepreneurs) on
growth and negative e¤ects of lawyers (rent-seekers).24
The results reported in column V constitute our preferred model. This speci…cation
has been obtained by subjecting the model in column IV to a composite hypothesis,
namely:

























(ii) equality of the coe¢cients for
h
# Tertiary Engineers






















23Indirect in the sense that they measure the e¤ects on growth from the interacion between those
with tertiary education on the one hand and computers on the other hand.
24Independent evidence in Mellander and Skedinger (1999) points in the same direction; they
show that in the mid 1990s wage premia for university education were much higher among business
administrators than among engineers, in seven European countries, in spite of a university degree
in engineering requiring more years of study. A possible interpretation of this result is that the
university wage premium for business administrators is ”too high” relative to the corresponding
premium for engineers.
35As indicated by the negligible di¤erence in R2 between columns IV and V, this hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of signi…cance. That (ii) cannot
be rejected is quite interesting. It means that it does not matter whose skills are
increased — the positive e¤ect on growth will be same.
In the end, we thus end up with a model containing only six parameters, which
explains almost 44 percent of the variation in the rate of total factor productivity
growth across industries and over time! This is quite remarkable. It is also a very clear
improvement over the four–parameter benchmark model (18) which only explains 27
percent of the variation in the productivity growth rates.
Comparing the model in column V of Table 6 with the benchmark model (18), we
see that the improvement has been achieved by replacing the share of computers in
total capital, KC=K, by interaction variables involving this same share and di¤erent
human capital indicators. In this sense, human capital certainly seems to be the key
to the IT productivity paradox.
However, while these results clearly show that the human capital variables are
essential, one might wonder about the importance of the computer capital share,
KC/K. Is this variable really essential, too, or can the human capital variables do the
job by themselves? To check this, we have performed non-nested tests of whether
KC/K should be included in the growth equations or not. The test we have used
is the one proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981). As this test cannot be
directly applied in the context of linear constraints of the kind that we have imposed
in column V of Table 6, we have only tested the speci…cations I - IV.25 The results of
the test are reported in Table 7.
In the …rst row of Table 7 we provide the test statistics for the case when the spec-
i…cations in Table 6 constitute the null hypotheses. The alternative, Ha, corresponds
25As shown by Pesaran and Hall (1998), it is not overly di¢cult to formulate non-nested tests
allowing for general linear restrictions. However, given the very clear outcomes of the tests reported
in Table 7 and the fact that, statistically, the speci…cations IV and V in Table 6 are very close we
have not taken the trouble to perform the generalized test on speci…cation V in Table 6.
36to when KC/K = 1 in the Table 6 regressions. In none of the tests can the null be
rejected at any standard level of signi…cance.
Table 7: Test statistics for non-nested tests of the presence of Kc/K in the
growth equation; critical value at 1% signi…cance level = 2.34
Model speci…cation
I II III IV
Ho: include Kc/K
Ha: exclude Kc/K
0.10 0.26 0.94 0.84
Ho: exclude Kc/K
Ha: include Kc/K
2.97 3.31 3.74 4.16
Note: i) the model speci…cations refer to the columns in Table 6
ii) ”include Kc/K” refers to the regressions in Table 6 while
”exclude Kc/K” means setting Kc/K=1 in those regressions
iii) the test statistic is asymptotically normally distributed.
In the second row, the roles of the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis
have been reversed. The null is very clearly rejected in favor of the alternative in each
one of the tests.
These results provide strong support for the notion that it is the interaction between
IT capital, as measured by KC/K, and human capital that drives our results, rather
than just the human capital variables. That the outcomes of non-nested tests are as
clear as in this case is not very common; often the tests produce inconsistent results
(reject both of the null hypotheses) or inconclusive results (reject neither).
The benchmark model speci…es the e¤ect of marginal increases in computers’ share
of capital to be constant, while our model allows these e¤ects to vary both over time
and by industries. This is illustrated in Figures 5a–c, showing the distributions of
the partial derivatives (19) across industries at three points in time, 1986, 1991 and
1995. The precision in these estimates has been calculated according to (20).
Note that the vertical axis in the …gures measures the e¤ects in percentage points.
The estimates can be interpreted as answering the following question: If the share of
computers in total capital increases by 1 percent, what is the resulting change in the
37rate of growth in total factor productivity, in percentage points? The bars indicate
the e¤ects for individual industries. The solid line is a weighted average e¤ect, where
the industries have been weighted according to their employment shares.
Looking at the development over time, we see that the marginal e¤ects of computer
investments have increased steadily over time. The weighted average e¤ect rises from
about 0.01 percentage point in 1986 to 0.05 in 1991, ending up at 0.17 percentage
points in 1995. These average changes have been caused by upward shifts in the entire
distributions of e¤ects across industries. For instance, while only two industries record
e¤ects above 1
10 of a percentage point in 1986, e¤ects of this magnitude are found in
six industries in 1991 and in 11 in 1995. In the latter year, the point estimates are
0.25 or higher in …ve industries, indicating that 1 percent increase in computers’ share
in total capital increases the rate of TFP growth by 1
4 of a percentage point or more.
At each point in time, there is considerable spread across industries. Among the
three years covered by Figure 5a–c, the largest variation is found in 1986.In that
year the spread is 0.46 percentage points, the range being given by a negative e¤ect
of ¡0:12 percentage points in 3840 = Transportation and a positive e¤ect of 0.34
percentage points in 3860 = Shipyards.26 In 1991 and 1995 the spread is considerably
smaller – about 0.30 percentage points in both years.
The upper range of the 1995 estimates is quite high: for …ve industries the point
estimates are 0.25 or higher, indicating that 1 percent increase in computers’ share
in total capital increases the rate of TFP growth by 1
4 of a percentage point or more.
In line with our …ndings, a comparison of Figure 5 and Table 4 shows that the
industries that had the largest increases in the shares of computers in total capital
26The shipyards rank very high in 1991 and 1995, too. Since the Swedish shipyards have under-
gone major structural changes since the mid 70’s and have been facing severe problems with low
and, sometimes, negative pro…ts this industry could be seen as a potential outlier. To check this,
we reestimated the model given by column V in Table 5, leaving out the shipyards. The parameters
changes were entirely negligible, however. The reason is the WLS estimation procedure where the
industries are weighted by employment; the shipyards account for less than 1 percent of manufac-
turing employment, during the period studied.
38Figure 5: Distributions over industries of the e¤ects of a marginal increase in
computers´share of capital on TFP growth; regression V, evaluated
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do not coincide with the industries that had the largest growth-enhancing e¤ects of
IT. For instance, the industries 3300 = Saw Mills and Wood Products and 3700 =
39Basic Metals, increased the relative size of their computer capital stock dramatically
between 1985 and 1990; cf Table 4. These investments did not result in top-ranking
marginal e¤ects of IT in either 1991 or 1995, however; see Figure 5. Similarly, the
doubling of the computer capital stock share in 3830 = Electrical Machinery between
1990 and 1994 only resulted in a marginal e¤ect of IT on growth that was about equal
to the average e¤ect across all industries; again compare Figure 5.
Finally, a notable result is that, compared to the U.S., we …nd positive impacts
of IT on growth in a broader spectrum of industries. According to Gordon (2000),
the e¤ects of computer investments were essentialy zero outside the IT-producing
industries and the industries producing durable manufacturing goods, in the U.S.
In the Swedish manufacturing sector, these industries roughly correspond to: 3810,
3820, 3830, 3840, 3850, and 3860; see Table 2. From Figure 5 it can be seen that
while we …nd large marginal e¤ects in some of these industries, notably in 3850 =
Instruments and 3860 = Shipyards, we also see examples of negative or very small
e¤ects as in, e.g., in 3810 = Metals and 3840 = Transportation, except shipyards
(essentially automobiles). On the other hand, there are several industries outside this
group recording large positive e¤ects like 3200 = Textiles and 3500 = Chemicals.
6 Summary and conclusions
Our principal conclusion from this study is the following: Yes, human capital is the
key to the IT productivity paradox! We substantiate this general conclusion with
both theoretical and empirical results.
Our theoretical analysis investigates the consequences of erroneously disregarding
human capital aspects in assessments of the e¤ects of IT on productivity growth.
Speci…cally, we consider a model where IT a¤ects growth both directly and indi-
rectly, through complementarity with human capital, and analyze what happens to
the estimate of the direct e¤ect when the indirect e¤ect is omitted.
40With respect to the negative e¤ects of IT on growth reported in studies based on
early (pre–1990) data for the U.S.27, we conclude that these results are likely to be
indicative of a truly negative e¤ect as suggested by Morrison (1997), rather than the
consequence of measurement error, as argued by, e.g., Lee and Barua (1999).
The positive connection between IT and productivity growth that has been found
in studies based on more recent U.S data28 is in our theoretical analysis attributed to
positive external e¤ects in the use of IT, arising through learning–by-investing and
knowledge spillovers, as in Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1999, Ch. 4). These external
e¤ects are assumed to be increasing in the total use of IT, implying that over time,
as more and more IT capital is accumulated, the growth e¤ects of IT increase, going
from negative to positive.
To check the validity of the model, we carry out a preliminary empirical analysis
where we regress productivity growth on IT, measured as the share of computers in
total capital, but where we do not account for human capital.
Running the regression on panel data for 14 Swedish manufacturing industries over
the period 1986-90, we obtain a negative estimate of the e¤ect of IT on productivity
growth. This estimate is small in absolute value and statistically insigni…cant. How-
ever, the theoretical analysis tells us that, nevertheless, the result indicates that IT
had a truly negative e¤ect on growth during this period. Thus, it seems like Morri-
son’s (op.cit.) result of overinvestment in IT in U.S. manufacturing is applicable to
the Swedish manufacturing sector, too.
In contrast, a regression covering the period 1991–95 generates a large positive
estimate of the direct e¤ect of IT on growth. The theoretical analysis tells us that if
the true e¤ect of IT was indeed positive during this period, then this estimate should
decrease if indirect e¤ects of IT are allowed for, through interaction between human
27See, e.g., Loveman (1988) and Berndt and Morrison (1995).
28Cf. Oliner and Sichel (2000).
41capital and IT. This prediction is veri…ed by the data.
Having thus established that the qualitative nature of the relationship between IT
and growth in Sweden seems to have been similar to that experienced by the U.S. and
that complementarity between IT and human capital may be important in explaining
this relation, we proceed with the actual empirical analysis.
For comparative purposes, we …rst run a simple regression, omitting human capital,
for the whole period, 1986–95. The resulting estimated direct e¤ect is statistically
signi…cant and equal to 0.18, implying that a 1 percent increase in computers’ share
of total capital will increase productivity growth by 0.18 percentage points. Thus, by
running the regression on data for the entire period we obtain a result which conceals
that the e¤ect of IT on growth has varied strongly over the period. As expected, the
model does not …t the data very well; only about 1
4 of the variation in total factor
productivity growth is explained.
Next, we include several interaction variables, involving the product of the IT
measure and various human capital indicators. The theoretical analysis predicts that
accounting for indirect e¤ects of IT in this way will reduce the estimated direct e¤ect.
This is precisely what happens – as successively more detailed information on human
capital is introduced the direct e¤ect …nally vanishes altogether. In the process,
control variables measuring the shares of females and immigrants among the workers
become insigni…cant, too.
We end up with a model that is very parsimonious in terms of parameters but,
nevertheless, explains well over 40 percent of the variation in total factor productivity
growth rates. In this model, all the interaction variables between IT and human
capital are highly signi…cant.
In general, the maintained hypothesis of complementarity between IT and high–
skilled workers is con…rmed. For workers whose education lie within a common …eld
of study, the indirect e¤ects of IT on growth are higher the higher the share among
42these workers with university education. The pattern is the same at lower levels of
education, where workers cannot be separated by …elds of study but only by level of
education. Somewhat surprising, the hypothesis that marginal skill upgrading has
the same e¤ect across di¤erent …elds of study and di¤erent levels of education cannot
be rejected.
The only exception to the complementarity relation between IT and skilled labor
concerns workers within the …eld of business administration. For these, skill upgrading
from upper secondary to university education is estimated to have a negative impact
on productivity growth. We interpret this result as evidence of the presence of rent-
seeking behavior among business administrator, which has a detrimental e¤ect on
growth, in the spirit of Murphy et al. (1991).
Regarding the connection between human capital and the age structure we …nd that
replacing workers over 50 by workers below 30 has a negative impact on productivity
growth rates. This indicates that, during the period studied, the advantage of many
of the younger workers of having become acquainted with IT during their school years
did not outweigh the work experience acquired by the older workers.
Due to the presence of the human capital variables, our simple model is able to
account very well for the increase over time in the growth–enhacing e¤ect of IT, that
was postulated in our theoretical analysis (and veri…ed by our preliminary empirics).
For the manufacturing sector as a whole, the model predicts that in the beginning
of the period, in 1986, a 1 percent increase in the share of computers in total cap-
ital, increased productivity growth by 0.01 percentage points only, i.e. an entirely
negligible e¤ect. In the middle of the period, in 1991, this average e¤ect had grown
to 0.05 percentage points, while at the end of the period, in 1995, it was up to 0.17
percentage points.
The inclusion of the human capital variables also allows the e¤ects of IT to vary
across industries. Our results clearly show that this is a very important feature.
43The variation across industries is substantial, although slightly decreasing over time.
In 1986 the IT growth e¤ects were distributed over the interval [–0.11, 0.34], corre-
sponding to a spread of 0.46 percentage points. In 1991 and 1995 the corresponding
intervals were [–0.05, 0.11] and [0.04, 0.34]. From the latter interval it can be inferred
that in 1995 marginal increases in computers’ share of capital were positive in all
industries. For several of these, the e¤ects were remarkably high; in …ve industries
the estimated e¤ect was 0.25 or higher, saying that a 1 percent increase in computers’
capital share increased productivity growth by at least 1
4 of a percentage point.
To check that our results are not driven solely by human capital developments but
by complementarity between IT and human capital, we perform non-tested tests for
the presence of the IT variable in the growth equations. These tests provide very
strong support for the complementarity hypothesis.
In line with this result, we …nd that the industries were the (relative) increases in
computer capital have been particularly large are not the same industries that show
the largest marginal e¤ects of IT on productivity growth.
With respect to di¤erences in e¤ects across industries, we also relate our …ndings
to the claim in Gordon (2000) that IT has increased productivity growth only in a
small number of U.S. industries. We show that, unlike in the U.S., the Swedish IT
development has had positive e¤ects outside the sectors producing IT and durable
manufacturing goods. We …nd strongly positive e¤ects also in, e.g., the chemical
industry and, even more interesting, in the textile industry.
With respect to policy considerations, one conclusions is immediate from the com-
plementarity between IT and skilled labor: measures to promote increased use of IT
should be followed up by measures promoting skill upgrading.29 Our results actually
29It is interesting to note that Swedish policies actually seem to be moving in this direction. Since
1998 there has been a tax rebate on the purchases of computers for private use, in order to promote
wide-spread use of IT. Currently, the government is investigating the possibilities to implement tax–
rebated personal ”competence accounts”, by means of which individuals can save for further edu-
cation of their own choice.
44show that, in general, upgrading skills at a given level of IT (i.e. share of comput-
ers in total capital) has a much stronger growth–enhancing e¤ect than increasing IT
investments at a given human capital structure. The latter e¤ect is the one that we
have discussed above; as noted these are seldom above 0.25.
To consider the former e¤ect, i.e. the e¤ect of skill upgrading, assume that among
engineering workers the share with university education is increased by 1 percent.
According to our estimates this will increase growth by 0.88 percentage points. The
same e¤ect can be obtained by similar human capital increases in the other categories
of workers considered, except for the business administrators.
Another policy implication concerns early retirement. Our results indicate that
measures aimed at facilitating early retirement among older workers, in order to
make more room for labor market entrants, can be (strongly) harmful for growth.30
It should be remembered, however, that our study is based on data ending quite a
few years back. Our results on the age structure might have changed during recent
years. Investigating whether this is the case is an important task for future research.
Another highly interesting extension is to carry out a similar analysis with respect
the service sector where the e¤ects of IT on growth might well be quite di¤erent from
those in manufacturing.
30Policies of this kind were tried in Sweden during the late 80s and early 90s.
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